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6
Governance Problems and 
Priorities for Local Climate 
Adaptation and Poverty Alleviation 
Stephen C. Smith
George Washington University
This chapter begins by reviewing the encouraging progress that has 
been made against poverty over the past three decades, but then it con-
siders some reasons for concern as to why further progress may be diffi -
cult. Two key constraints are environmental stress and poor governance. 
Governance failures slow economic growth and often particularly affect 
the poor; they may also lead to violent confl ict, with particular harm to 
people living in poverty. Environmental degradation can cause poverty 
and indirectly lead to confl ict. Adaptation on the parts of both govern-
ment and the private sector is an essential response to climate change, 
and people who successfully adapt may also be less vulnerable to vio-
lence, as well as less likely to provoke confl ict. But without good gov-
ernance, actions people take to try to adapt to climate change may in 
themselves trigger confl ict. Thus, it is essential to improve governance 
for adaptation, both in terms of government’s overall planned adaptation 
responses and in its facilitation of successful, harmonious, and autono-
mous adaptation in the private sector and civil society. 
PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: THE GLASS IS HALF FULL 
Clear Progress on Poverty since 1980
Since 1980, the fraction of the world’s population living on less 
than $1.25 a day has fallen from over 40 percent down to just over 20 
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percent. Indeed, given that some have put forward higher estimates of 
the number living in poverty in China in 1980, the global incidence of 
extreme poverty in that year may have been closer to 50 percent. The 
World Bank reports that its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
target of halving the fraction of people that were living in poverty in 
1990 (about 40 percent that year) by the year 2015 had already been 
achieved by 2010 (United Nations 2012). Moreover, 6 of the 10 fastest-
growth economies since 2005 have been in Africa, the region with the 
greatest fraction in poverty (World Bank 2013). On the other hand, with 
the commodity price declines coinciding with the growth slowdown 
in China, the sustainability of this higher growth level is called into 
question.
There has also been impressive improvement in most health indica-
tors (Smith 2005). Life expectancy has risen, under-fi ve mortality has 
fallen, and maternal mortality has been reduced. Education enrollments 
have also risen, along with basic literacy. While it remains in dispute 
as to whether incomes are converging globally, there is little doubt that 
there has been convergence in education and health levels in recent 
decades, and the international convergence of health and of education 
are mutually reinforcing (Sab and Smith 2002; UNDP 2012). 
Improved governance is foundational to successful development 
(North 1990), and there has been an impressive spread of democracy 
and of government transparency (UNDP 2012). 
Remaining Poverty Challenges
But some of the important MDG targets—such as halving world 
hunger—will not be achieved by the 2015 deadline (World Bank 2011). 
There is a growing concentration of poverty in confl ict-affected 
states and regions with deteriorating environments—precisely where 
progress is most diffi cult (World Bank 2010a, 2011; World Resources 
Institute et al. 2011). 
And environmental decay is proceeding at a pace few had predicted 
20 years ago. Among other things, this is posing serious threats to the 
natural-resource-based livelihoods that so many of the global poor 
depend upon (World Resource Institute et al. 2011). 
Thus, much remains to be done—although the glass is half full, it 
remains half empty. 
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About 1.2 billion people currently subsist on less than $1.25 a day 
(the adjusted level, still known as the “dollar a day” level), and about 
2.7 billion—nearly two-fi fths of the world’s population—live on less 
than $2 a day. At least 300 million people live in chronic extreme pov-
erty (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5). 
Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has shown far less progress than 
other developing regions. While the fraction living in poverty has gone 
down somewhat in the past decade, the head count (number) of individ-
uals living in poverty rose dramatically in the 1981–2010 period, from 
about 205 million to about 414 million. The concentration of poverty 
may make it more diffi cult to redress. In most countries, the poverty gap 
has gone down along with the poverty head count. But between 1981 
and 2010, the average income of the extremely poor hardly increased 
in sub-Saharan Africa, remaining near an appalling 70 cents per person 
per day (World Bank 2013). 
This stagnation is closely connected to the lack of a sustained Green 
Revolution in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has very little irrigation, a 
factor that worsens constraints as climate change accelerates. World 
Bank research reveals that in 2007 only about 4 percent of farmland 
in sub-Saharan Africa was irrigated. Africa’s risky, rain-fed agriculture 
contrasts with 39 percent irrigation incidence in South Asia and 29 per-
cent incidence in East Asia and the Pacifi c. Moreover, despite progress, 
more than three-quarters of cereal-producing farmland in sub-Saharan 
Africa uses unimproved seeds, often in unfertilized, depleted fi elds, 
with yields dependent upon increasingly unreliable rainfall (see World 
Bank 2007). 
The Multiple Dimensions of Poverty 
Global poverty is about more than income, and is not automatically 
solved through economic growth. Poverty is characterized by early 
death, poor health, denial of education, and indeed the loss of child-
hood (Smith 2005). Thus, poverty is multidimensional and is character-
ized by health problems, undernutrition, child labor, illiteracy, under-
fi ve mortality, degraded environment, disempowerment, and social 
exclusion. Nearly 1.7 billion people live in multidimensional poverty, 
according to the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) constructed by 
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2012). In sum, 
poverty problems are not readily solved with higher income alone. 
Poverty is pervasiveness of early death. Kofi  Annan said, “This 
[extreme poverty] is a poverty that kills” (United Nations 2005, p. 7). In 
some countries—Afghanistan, Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, and Sierra Leone—about one-fi fth of all children die before age 
fi ve from preventable causes. Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa 
is just 53. In South Asia, nearly 1 child in 12 dies before age fi ve. The 
under-fi ve mortality rate is 118 per 1,000 in low-income countries, 51 
per 1,000 in middle-income countries, and 7 per 1,000 in high-income 
countries (World Bank 2011). Every day, an average of nearly 20,000 
children in developing countries die from preventable causes. This 
amounted to over seven million in 2012 alone. 
Poverty is hunger and poor health. The International Classifi -
cation of Diseases includes “Code Z59.5—extreme poverty” (Smith 
2005). About 900 million people are classifi ed as hungry (undernour-
ished) by the United Nations’ World Food Organization (WFO). There 
are many other severe health deprivations. Micronutrient malnutrition 
affects nearly two billion; children may face lifelong disabilities (see, 
e.g., Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey [2006]). Women with nutritional 
defi ciencies are more likely to deliver smaller babies, who are at risk of 
having poor growth and development. In many poor countries, parasites 
are widespread. In developing countries, a woman dies during child-
birth nearly every minute—very few of these women would have died 
if they had lived in a developed country. It has been estimated that as 
many as 3,000 children in Africa die from malaria each day. 
Poverty is the denial of the right to a basic education. As of 2012, 
there were about 776 million illiterate adults in the world (UNESCO 
2014). Nearly 40 percent of all adults in South Asia are illiterate. Often, 
students go to school only to fi nd the teacher is absent: “teacher tru-
ancy” is a major scourge in South Asia and is also common in Africa. 
A child in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia can expect to receive less 
than fi ve years of schooling. In at least 12 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, a child is more likely to die before the age of fi ve than to attend 
secondary school. 
up15sapeogch6.indd   114 5/27/2015   1:15:50 PM
Governance Problems and Priorities for Local Climate Adaptation   115
Poverty is the loss of childhood. According to the International 
Labour Organization, there are at least 215 million child laborers (ILO 
2010), and 115 million of these children are engaged in what the ILO 
classifi es as “hazardous work.” Approximately 91 million working chil-
dren are under 12 years old. Millions of child laborers are trapped in 
slavery, traffi cking, debt bondage, prostitution, pornography, and other 
abhorrent conditions. 
Special Challenges for Poverty Reduction 
It is well established that growth and development, although they 
are not a panacea, can reduce poverty. But the causality appears to run 
in both directions: it is also becoming increasingly understood that suc-
cessful poverty reduction can cause growth. Failure to address poverty 
produces constraints on prospects for development, for at least four 
reasons:
 1) Poor health, nutrition, and education lower the economic pro-
ductivity of people in poverty, leading directly and indirectly 
to slower growth. 
 2) Higher income for the poor raises demand for locally produced 
goods (albeit of lower quality). 
 3) The poor often lack access to credit, which constrains growth. 
In particular, the result can be lost opportunities for entrepre-
neurship that might benefi t society. It can also render the poor 
unable to fi nance their children’s education, thus limiting the 
skilled labor force needed for development. 
 4) Poverty creates incentives for high fertility as a source of old-
age fi nancial security; high fertility is associated with a slower 
rate of economic growth (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5). 
The Role of Good Governance 
Good governance—which, as the editors of this volume point out 
in the introductory chapter, is also multidimensional—plays an essen-
tial role in achieving multidimensional poverty-reduction goals. The 
relationship between economic growth and effective poverty reduction 
is not inevitable, but it is possible. Economic growth helps to reduce 
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poverty in most places, most of the time. As is well known, good gov-
ernance—or at least avoidance of actively bad governance—is essential 
to increase growth rates and keep them high. Particularly to the extent 
that growth is not suffi cient to reduce poverty, governance is needed to 
design and implement active public policies and effective, accessible 
basic services and social programs to attack poverty directly. Good gov-
ernance plays a critical role in preventing coercion and exploitation of 
the poor. It provides for two-way channels of communication between 
the poor and both national and local government. A voice for the poor is 
essential to bring both longstanding and new problems—such as nega-
tive climate change impacts—to government and (more broadly) citi-
zen attention. 
Another key function of good governance is the provision of rel-
evant and reliable information. Globally, more than two-thirds of the 
poor live in rural areas, and many of them are smallholder farmers 
using outmoded and no longer appropriate technology. Poor farmers 
can greatly benefi t from government-provided agricultural extension 
information (such as has benefi ted farmers in the United States since 
the nineteenth century). Government also plays a key role in encour-
aging the use of improved seed varieties and other Green Revolution 
practices, including the expansion of irrigation. Such assistance will be 
all the more important as climate change becomes large enough to cre-
ate conditions outside the range of farmers’ experience. 
Again, development itself can be constrained by a high incidence 
of poverty, adding to the signifi cance of good governance in achiev-
ing more narrowly defi ned economic objectives, as Sisay Asefa and 
Wei-Chiao Huang assert in the introduction to this volume. 
Why is it so diffi cult for the poorest of the poor to make further 
progress? One reason is the presence of poverty traps, which poor gov-
ernance often exacerbates. 
Addressing poverty traps. Poverty traps occur at both macro 
and micro levels. The notion of poverty traps goes back to the early 
days of post–World War II development economics. Nobel laureate 
Gunnar Myrdal called it a problem of “circular and cumulative cau-
sation” (Myrdal 1968, p. 1875). To overcome macro poverty traps, a 
“big push” may be needed, a concept pioneered by Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943), who fi rst raised some of the basic problems that can 
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underpin a poverty trap, such as lack of coordination among investors. 
High-fertility traps can exist because of a different kind of coordina-
tion problem: if all families had lower fertility, all would be better off, 
but as long as most other families are having many children, it is too 
economically risky for a family to be a “pioneer” in having only two 
children (Dasgupta 1993). Population pressures also fi gure in classic 
Malthusian traps, in which a society cannot escape from subsistence 
income because additional resources only go to maintain larger popu-
lation sizes (Urdal 2005). Many of these concepts have been formal-
ized in more recent years (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 4). Another 
coordination failure is at work in the low-skills trap: workers who want 
skills that employers can use and employers who want equipment that 
workers can use may each be better off waiting for the other parties to 
invest fi rst—but the result is that there are no modern jobs in a region.
Collier et al. (2003) fi nd that countries are prone to civil war when 
faced with a combination of low income, slow growth, and dependence 
on primary commodity exports. We return to this problem, which the 
authors describe as part of a “confl ict trap,” later in the chapter. 
Many of these traps can also be found at a subnational level, or even 
at a district scale, including low-skill traps. Others are found primarily 
at the micro and even individual levels. 
A well-known example is the undernutrition trap, in which workers 
are unproductive because they have insuffi cient energy, and as a result 
they earn too little income to purchase suffi cient calories and protein to 
improve their levels of energy (e.g., Dasgupta [1993]). This trap may 
not be common outside of famine conditions, but it may become a more 
serious concern if it interlocks with other traps to make the cycle more 
vicious. Similar cycles of individual deprivation can be caused by, or 
aggravated by, health problems that one is too poor to address, which 
may include mental health problems triggered or accentuated by stresses 
associated with living in poverty. They may also be caused by poor hous-
ing traps, in which bad housing (if not homelessness) prolongs illness, 
produces exposure to crime, leads to chronic sleep deprivation, and so 
on. Working-capital traps lead small vendors to maintain low invento-
ries, which in turn yield low sales and result in an inability to accumulate 
capital to allow for a larger inventory. Microfi nance has developed in 
part to address this problem—almost 200 million people have partici-
pated, but that leaves hundreds of millions more who might also benefi t.
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Environmental degradation can also fi gure into poverty traps. In 
common-property resource traps, overuse of resources that lack well-
defi ned property rights or effective community management (Ostrom 
2005) can lead to poverty: lakes are overfi shed, forests are not managed 
sustainably, land is overgrazed. Part of the problem is that community 
management of common resources has broken down. This is often a 
legacy of greedy colonial practices, now all too often imitated by post-
colonial regimes. Once it has broken down, responsible use of shared 
resources is diffi cult to restore. Under some conditions, well-regulated 
privatization can be benefi cial, providing an incentive to a recognized 
owner to monitor and maintain the value of these resources.
But in many situations, the result is merely the disenfranchisement 
of the poor, and the loss of their access to the natural resources on which 
their livelihoods have depended. In many cases, local conditions make 
it impossible to privatize common property effi ciently, let alone equita-
bly. Effective community management of the commons is an important 
priority for improved local and community governance with assistance 
from regional or national government levels—increasingly so as cli-
mate change threatens the productivity of these resources.
Another example is the farm erosion trap, in which the poor face 
such urgent need to grow more food that they have to overuse their 
land, even though in many cases they are aware that the result will be 
reduced soil fertility—hence, reduced productivity in future seasons. 
As a result, farmers may be trapped in a downward spiral, in which 
productivity gains from learning new techniques are undermined by the 
poorer quality of the soil. There is evidence of poverty-trap problems 
among farmers in Ethiopia, particularly in the impoverished region that 
grows enset (a type of root crop that resembles a small banana tree) 
(Kwak and Smith [2013]; see also Deressa [2007]). 
TWO RELATED CONSTRAINTS TO ENDING POVERTY: 
1) ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND 
2) POOR GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT 
Two core problems in ending global poverty (when commentators 
speak of “ending” global poverty they generally mean reducing it to 
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“frictional” amounts, perhaps 100 to 300 million people) are 1) envi-
ronmental degradation and 2) severe governance problems (including 
overt confl ict). These dimensions of environmental and governance 
breakdowns are increasingly intertwined. 
Confl ict and Threats to Natural Resource–Based Livelihoods 
Natural resource–based livelihoods are counted on in most antipov-
erty strategies as potential “pathways out of poverty” (World Resources 
Institute et al. 2005). In low-income countries, there is high dependence 
on natural resources: agriculture, animal husbandry, fi shing, forestry, 
hunting, and foraging. But access to the benefi ts of resources is often 
very inequitable: in some regions, the poor have been losing control of 
natural-resource common areas on which they depend. Village com-
mon lands may be “spontaneously” privatized (or, to put less of a fi ne 
point on it, stolen). Many of the poor lack even basic capital, including 
farmland, forests, cattle, boats, and equipment. Government offi cials 
may overlook (or be paid to ignore) companies that log, fi sh, and mine 
without regard to local inhabitants or traditional rights. Governments 
may also designate lands as “protected,” thus banning local people from 
earning a livelihood, while corruption remains; the result is that the poor 
have no incentive to take part in environmental protection. A solution 
to this is the principle of “pro-poor governance,” which simply means 
empowerment of people living in poverty. Failure to provide pro-poor 
governance can worsen poverty, trigger confl ict, or both (Todaro and 
Smith 2011, Section 14.5). 
Consequences of Confl ict
Violent confl ict harms well-being in ways both obvious and unex-
pected, extending well beyond the immediate effects of death, injury, 
and destruction. People not involved in violence can be affected almost 
immediately, as parents lose their livelihood or become refugees and 
children are forced to work. Recovery from the consequences can take 
many years. Confl ict can cause children to miss out on schooling in their 
most formative years, harming their well-being over the course of a life-
time (see, e.g., Barron [2010]; Blattman and Annan [2010]; Blattman 
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and Miguel [2010]; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh [2009]; Li and 
Wen [2005]; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione [2001]; and Seitz [2004]).
When armed confl ict fi rst breaks out in a country or a region, more 
men die than women, primarily as a result of the fi ghting itself. But over 
time, more women die, as they suffer lingering consequences. Maternal 
mortality (dying from complications of pregnancy or childbirth) can 
reach about 3 percent in confl ict areas such as the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo. The long-term effects of confl ict fall most heavily 
on women, as these effects diminish their access to health, social wel-
fare services, and education (Plümper and Neumayer 2006). Rape is a 
weapon of terror used to destroy communities and family bonds. Many 
victims die in rape attacks, and many more suffer long-term health con-
sequences, including AIDS and chronic depression. Refugee children 
and women are at risk of rape and sexual exploitation. Refugee tent 
camps can spread infectious diseases such as diarrhea, measles, acute 
respiratory diseases, malaria, and sexually transmitted diseases, includ-
ing HIV/AIDS. Refugees die of diseases at high rates—more might 
survive with better nourishment and rest. Evidence suggests that each 
additional international refugee leads to an extra 1.4 malaria cases in 
the host country. Meanwhile, government health spending falls, just 
when public health support is most needed. 
Development in reverse. Violent confl ict destroys capital; some 
that is not destroyed is diverted from productive to destructive activi-
ties (Murdoch and Sandler 2004). Additional wealth is often shipped 
abroad. On average, about one-tenth of a country’s wealth is transferred 
abroad between the beginning of a confl ict and its end, largely because 
of capital fl ight (Collier et al. 2003). 
Countries consumed by confl ict have an estimated average annual 
growth of −3.3 percent, constituting what is known as “development 
in reverse.” Incomes following a civil war average 15 percent lower 
than before the war. This translates to approximately 30 percent more 
people living in extreme poverty. The loss of human capital is sub-
stantial: when children lose out on their education, it has permanent 
effects in many cases, even though some students later return to school. 
Spending on education falls during confl icts, severely exacerbating the 
problems. The torn social fabric is, in itself, destructive to development 
opportunities. 
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Theories of the causes of confl ict vary, including the presence of 
horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000, 2008), severe scarcity of basic 
resources, as in some interpretations of the Darfur confl icts (UNEP 
2007), commitment problems between government and (potential) reb-
els (Powell 2006), and the struggle to control valuable natural resources 
for export (Collier 2007). 
Climate Stressors as a Trigger for Confl ict
Evidence is emerging that climate stressors are also important trig-
gers for confl ict. In particular, although climate change may be neither a 
necessary nor a suffi cient cause for confl ict, climate can be a contribut-
ing and triggering stressor, acting in concert with other political, social, 
or economic variables. This is of growing concern, given the range of 
dire consequences for Africa and some other regions of the develop-
ing world predicted under most climate-change scenarios (Cline 2007; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007; NOAA 2010; 
Parry et al. 2007; World Bank 2010a), including prolonged droughts, 
expanded desertifi cation, increased severity of storms, higher tempera-
tures and more severe heat waves, deteriorated water resources, and 
reduced crop yields. 
Climate change may endanger livelihoods, intensify confl icts over 
resources, and induce greater migration within, and across, national 
boundaries. In countries with weak governments and institutions, these 
added stresses may lead to greater instability. Countries with greater 
societal resilience are likely to withstand these stresses better, as well 
as to build greater resilience to climate change. Moreover, a growing 
literature documents a link between rainfall levels and violence, as well 
as between high temperatures and violence or civil confl ict (Burke et al. 
2009; Miguel 2013). 
Adaptation Responses and Their Impacts on Confl ict Risk 
Most discussion about climate change has been focused on 
approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But most low-income 
countries emit relatively small amounts of greenhouse gases (although 
the burning involved in deforestation and the resulting decrease in 
carbon dioxide absorption are signifi cant contributors). And for low-
income developing countries, climate change impacts are already arriv-
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ing and must be responded to. Thus, the central focus in these countries 
is on adaptation to current and anticipated adverse climate change (see, 
e.g., Adger et al. [2007]; Dinar et al. [2008]; Malik and Smith [2012]; 
Mendelsohn [2012]; World Bank [2010b]; and World Resources Insti-
tute et al. [2011]). 
There are two basic approaches to adaptation. Planned (or policy-
driven) adaptation is undertaken by governments. In contrast, autono-
mous adaptation is undertaken by individuals, families, and communi-
ties; Malik and Smith (2012) give some key examples, including altering 
crop or livestock varieties, changing livelihoods, increasing exploitation 
of common pool resources, moving locally (such as to higher ground), 
and migrating temporarily or permanently, either within a country or 
internationally. Almost certainly, autonomous adaptation will be the pre-
dominant form of adaptation. Good governance acts as a complement 
for autonomous adaptation (and, at least, avoids thwarting benefi cial 
responses). But governments have little experience with this role, and in 
some cases their incentives may lie in implementing policies that have 
the effect of undermining otherwise constructive adaptation measures in 
poor communities, such as removing control of natural resources from 
communities and placing it in the hands of offi cials who mismanage or 
misuse that control. 
PERSPECTIVES ON GOOD GOVERNANCE 
FOR ADAPTATION 
General Considerations 
Policy effectiveness, economic effi ciency, and equity may be 
improved to the extent that seven conditions are in place. Policymakers 
want to ensure that
 1)  a fl exible, well-designed approach to interaction is imple-
mented between adaptation policy and the autonomous adap-
tation setting;
 2)  they gain an improved understanding of how agents adapt 
in the absence of planned adaptation, and how adaptation is 
likely to change in response to planned adaption policies; 
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 3)  the moral hazard of agents in response to planned adaptation is 
addressed;
 4)  those autonomously adapting have a voice in adaptation poli-
cies that affect them; 
 5)  planned adaptation does not reduce opportunity for autono-
mous adaptation, and that planned adaptation accounts for 
indirect impacts (for example, the diversion of water resources 
from areas with traditional rights to cities or irrigated districts 
with political clout, and an accounting for the impacts of gov-
ernment restrictions on development in low-lying areas); 
 6)  negative externalities of autonomous adaptation are addressed 
effectively—e.g., lowered water tables, salination, and wors-
ened sanitation in neighboring areas; and 
 7)  positive externalities of autonomous adaptation, such as learn-
ing across neighboring communities, are effectively encour-
aged and augmented. 
Climate Change Adaptation through Migration
Threats to natural resource–based livelihoods are expected to 
increase the rate of rural-to-urban migration (see, e.g., Hatton and 
Williamson [2003]; Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2011; 
McLeman and Smit [2006]; Naudé [2010]; and Warner et al. [2009]). 
Lower productivity increases the wedge (or gap) separating urban and 
rural incomes, spurring migration that may eventually include hundreds 
of millions of people. Migration on such a scale would result in compe-
tition for resources and employment that would heighten the potential 
for confl ict and instability. A case in point is reported from Bangladesh, 
where economic competition between “climate migrants” and residents 
of destination areas has led in some cases to violence. Among the causes 
of tension between the two groups was a drop in wages—especially 
wages in the informal sector—that was due to the infl ux of migrants. In 
another case in point, this one from Sudan, environmental and farming 
changes led to changed seasonal migration routes, worsening tensions 
among pastoralists (those who raise and herd livestock) and between 
pastoralists and farmers. 
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Governance challenges of heightened competition for resources. 
The absence of established institutions for managing natural resources 
in areas newly settled by different ethnic groups has led to environ-
mental degradation; in turn, the resulting degradation has exacerbated 
resource scarcity, fueled tensions, and led to violent confl ict (see, e.g., 
Barnett and Adger [2007]; Bronkhorst [2011]; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 
[2011]; Sayne [2011]; Stark, Mataya, and Lubovich [2009]; Theisen 
[2008]; and UNEP [2007]). Confl ict is more likely to emerge in the 
absence of a well-defi ned or well-enforced system of property rights: 
traditional inhabitants of an area may stake customary claims to land 
that formally may be (has been declared to be) open-access public 
land. Good-quality formal governance must at least take traditional 
governance into account in planning and policy. As a case in point 
from Nigeria, feed and water shortages caused partly by drought and 
desertifi cation induced pastoralists to move south, outside their tradi-
tional seasonal grazing patterns. In turn, sedentary farmers responded to 
weather-related changes by cultivating more land. This left pastoralists 
with little uncontested land on which to graze and water their animals, 
leading to violent confl icts between identity groups fi nding themselves 
in contested territory, such as farmers and herdsmen (pastoralists). As a 
second case in point, in Kenya, increased drought induced pastoralists 
to adopt more sedentary livelihoods, settling near water sources that 
farmers also relied upon and that were already at risk. 
A related challenge is that in the process of both autonomous and 
planned adaptation to climate change, traditional access to natural 
resources can be restricted, and the result can heighten tensions. With-
out effective formal or traditional institutions to deal with these conse-
quences, autonomous adaptation can increase the risk of confl ict. A case 
in point comes from coastal Bangladesh, where water from tube wells 
became more prone to saltwater contamination, which in turn induced 
inhabitants of affected areas to draw water from unaffected wells in 
neighboring areas. This, of course, fueled tensions—and led to episodes 
of violent confl ict—with the inhabitants of these areas. 
Planned adaptation, government policies, and confl ict. Planned 
adaptation (and, more generally, government policy) can increase the 
risk of confl ict when it acts to restrict feasible autonomous adaptation 
(Malik and Smith 2012). For example, policies to vacate densely popu-
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lated areas that have become subject to inundation increase pressures 
on adjacent land; this can clearly give rise to confl ict. In contrast, con-
structing barriers such as fl oodgates to protect vulnerable land might, in 
some circumstances, avoid confl ict risk. But building such barriers may 
also have unintended consequences, such as harming the livelihoods of 
others by eroding coastlines and reducing fi shing opportunities along 
adjoining areas of the coast. 
To cite another example, policies restricting migration within 
or across countries could avoid tensions and reduce the risk of con-
fl ict. But restrictions could also increase the risk because migration is 
a safety valve that itself represents an important form of autonomous 
adaptation. 
Government infl uence in preventing communal confl icts depends 
on two key factors. 
First, it depends on whether government is strong enough to protect 
people and communities from external threats—i.e., strong enough to 
enforce property rights and impose needed regulations on communities. 
If government is weak, property rights cannot be protected, and effec-
tive planned adaptation is infeasible; hence, the possibility of confl ict 
between the two communities cannot be avoided. 
Second, while government must have suffi cient authority and 
strength to enforce the peace, the poor may be subjected to equal or 
greater harm when government is unduly coercive, biased, or unwill-
ing to decentralize authority. The quality of governance relationships 
between the central government and local communities (or regions) 
is of critical importance. At one extreme, government repression may 
trigger confl ict. However, if national or regional government neglects 
a community, this may also trigger confl ict when the community per-
ceives the government to be ineffective, if not hostile. Poor gover-
nance responses to climate change can hinder autonomous adaptation 
rather than complement it, also resulting in confl ict. The situation can 
be aggravated if government is seen as siding with one community 
over another. For example, confl ict may result if government prevents 
migration from a severely climate-affected community to an area less 
affected that may be perceived as unfairly privileged. International peer 
review of governments can play an important role in improving indi-
vidual country governance practices; a good example is the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an activity of the African 
Union (see http://www.nepad.org/).
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In these ways, good governance plays a central role in poverty 
reduction in general, and particularly in response to looming develop-
ment problems caused by climate change. By anticipating and construc-
tively responding to these problems, good governance can lessen the 
harmful effects of climate change on a government’s people. 
Note
This chapter is based on a Sichel Lecture of a similar title in the series on the Politi-
cal Economy of Good Governance, which was delivered on the campus of Western 
Michigan University on April 10, 2013. The presentation drew on joint work with Arun 
Malik, with input from Elizabeth Chacko, Marie Price, and Jonathan Rothbaum; these 
contributions greatly benefi ted the preparation of this chapter. I would also like to thank 
participants of the Sichel Lecture for excellent discussions, particularly Sisay Asefa and 
Wei-Chiao Huang. Research assistance from the Institute for International Economic 
Policy at George Washington University is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are 
my own. 
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